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In Defence of Quasi-Contract
Dan Priel*

Restitution scholars are almost unanimous in rejecting the term quasi-contract. This essay
challenges this view. It begins by demonstrating that many debates among restitution scholars are
in fact debates about the boundaries of consent-based liability.This serves as an introduction to
the main thesis advanced, which is that the idea of quasi-contract, which is supposed to cover cases
in which the parties would have made a contract if conditions allowed them to do so, helps to
explain the doctrine better than the conclusory language of unjust enrichment. The essay
concludes by situating the argument within the growing literature on the normative foundations
of restitution. It argues that quasi-contractual liability should be understood not as part of unjust
enrichment, but as a different basis of liability that can help us see what liability for unjust
enrichment might be: liability grounded in notions of fairness.

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘quasi-contract’, once used to describe the area of law now called
‘restitution’ or ‘unjust enrichment’, is now out of favour. Peter Birks, the
preeminent restitution scholar of his generation, explained why:

‘Quasi-contract’ says only that the matter is not contract. So far as it suggests that
there is a sort of contract, it deceives, unintelligibly.A quasi-sparrow is not a sparrow.
In what respect it might resemble sparrows is left to speculation . . . A deceptive
name is a constant impediment.1

Talking about the close term of ‘implied contract’ Andrew Burrows was equally
hostile. The notion, he argued,

was fictional and said nothing about why the promise should be implied. By masking
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the underlying basis for recovery the theory obscured the important similarities and
differences between the cases reversing benefits received. Moreover it was contrary to
the rule of law for judges to reach decisions without properly explaining their
reasoning.2

Strong words. But also, I think, quite problematic. One wonders, for instance,
about Birks and Burrows’s commitment to the elimination of fictions when both
frequently use the concept of ‘constructive trust’, which wears its fictional nature
on its sleeve. One wonders whether it is clarity of language that they are after
when they both frequently use the term ‘unjust enrichment’ – Birks even used
this term as the title of the book from which the quote comes – only to stress
elsewhere how little their topic has to do with justice, with Birks going so far as to
say that ‘[b]ut for the need to retain a trace of normativity, one might just as well
speak of pink enrichment’.3 Burrows’s claim that judges who relied on this term
violated the rule of law by not explaining their reasoning is odder still. All those
judges who presumably obscured their real reasoning by using the concept of
‘quasi-contract’ instead of the principle that supposedly really explained their
decisions did so (one would think) according to their best understanding of the
law, indeed by following what the law by everyone’s reckoning at the time was.
How could doing so be a violation of the rule of law? Burrows faces a dilemma: if
there is a separate principle of unjust enrichment that was part of the law even
before it was endorsed by the courts, that would contradict his claim to be
describing the law of restitution as it is found in the ‘decided cases’.4 But if the
principle was not part of the law at the time, then the courts were not violating

the rule of law by not following it. And if it is the obscurity of the labels that
Burrows is worried about, violating the rule of law by making its content
incomprehensible to laypeople, one wonders how much sense the uninitiated
will make of terms like ‘negative benefit’, ‘incontrovertible benefit’, ‘free
acceptance’, ‘subjective devaluation’ and a host of others that are stock in trade for
the contemporary restitution lawyer.
There is, however, perhaps a more plausible version of this criticism. In early
treatments of the subject now known as restitution or unjust enrichment it was
thought that the law of quasi-contract is filled by whatever is not contract and
tort, including obligations arising from statute or judgment.5 But telling us only
that liability in this area should be treated ‘as if it had a contractual origin’,6 by
itself placed no constraint, not did it provide any guidance as to the content of the
obligation in question. For those who worried that terms like ‘unjust enrichment’
or ‘ex aequo et bono’ would send the courts down the dangerous path of ‘vague
jurisprudence which is sometimes styled “justice as between man and man”’,7
quasi-contract may have seemed even more open-ended. In this essay I will
nonetheless argue that if we are interested in making sense of the law, then the
term ‘quasi-contract’ can actually be quite helpful and illuminating for
understanding part of the law now classified as unjust enrichment.8
One purpose of this essay, then, is clarificatory: I aim to show that on the issues
in question the language of unjust enrichment can be obscuring, vacuous, and
misleading. It is obscuring when it stands in the way of recognising the normative
considerations that govern the cases at hand; it is vacuous when it does not

provide any normative guidance; and it is misleading when it suggests remedies
the law does not actually provide. I will argue that looking at those cases from a
contractual perspective is helpful on all fronts. My more general and theoretical
concern is to question some aspects of doctrinal scholarship and the focus it
places on identifying the ‘correct’ taxonomy of legal rules by carefully attending
to legal doctrine. This, I will argue, is a hopeless goal without a clearer
understanding of the extra-legal normative issues at hand.
Here is how I plan to proceed. In the first section I argue that when examining
the language and considerations used to determine whether liability should be
imposed in many cases treated as examples of restitutionary liability, we see that
they are better understood as cases about the limits of consent-based liability. I
argue that considering these cases from a contractual perspective identifies the
instances in which liability is imposed and those in which it is not better than the
conclusory language of restitution. In the second section I examine the question
of remuneration for assistance given at times of emergency. In this context I show
that restitution law is not only unhelpful but is in fact misleading, for it cannot
explain the remedies that are typically awarded in such cases. I use this type of case
to argue that once we recognise the contractual element in them, we can develop
a more precise set of conditions under which liability should be imposed. In these
cases it would be appropriate to call the liability ‘quasi-contractual’, because it
would be imposed in cases where there is no valid contract between the parties,
but which are fruitfully analysed as though there is one. In the third section I turn
from doctrinal details to the broader picture and consider the relevance of the

preceding discussion to the question of the theoretical foundations of
restitutionary liability, a topic that received considerable attention in recent
years. I argue there that there is no reason to think that the foundation of the
cases I considered earlier lies in the notion of corrective justice; instead I suggest
that the normative basis of these cases should be traced to norms of fairness. I
show how considerations of fairness play a role in explaining why liability is
imposed in quasi-contractual cases, and I suggest more tentatively what role
fairness might have in underlying liability for unjust enrichment.

THE BOUNDARIES OF CONSENT

The general rule: no liability for unconsented services

The basic rule with regard to unconsented services is that the recipient is not
liable to pay for the benefit he received. For instance, if you mistakenly think I
asked for my house to be painted, and you did so while I was away,I do not have
to pay you for the service, even if I like the house better now, and even if its
market value has increased as a result. I do not have to pay even if I intended to
get it painted in exactly the same way upon my return. At first blush this seems
to be the exact opposite of the rule with regard to mistakes that confer benefits
in kind. If you mistakenly send me a parcel that was intended to someone else,
I do not thereby become the owner and you are entitled to get it back. Why does
the law treat these cases so differently?

Jack Beatson tried to solve this conundrum by arguing that in the case of
unconsented services there is no enrichment.9 But there is no good reason to
say that as a matter of law there was no enrichment in these cases: No doubt
there will be services that I will never agree to pay for, and probably some that
I would even demand payment to receive, but this is a factual matter on which
the parties could present evidence. It might be argued, then, that the problem
is not that there is no enrichment, but that there are great difficulties in
measuring it, and that the law’s response – of which there are many other
examples10 – is to have a substantive rule whose real reason is procedural. To
allow parties to argue on this matter would require the defendant to prove that
she has not benefited subjectively from the service, and such claims would be
hard to verify. While this is a possible explanation, it is not clear that assessing
the value of the enrichment in the case of services is an insurmountable
obstacle. After all, there is a market for most services, and even if we assume
that the recipient was unwilling to pay the market price for the service, the
law’s reluctance to make any effort to find the subjective value for the
enrichment to the claimant may seem odd. Low as it might be, the value
of the service to the claimant will almost always be more than zero. Why not
allow

the provider of the unconsented service restitution for this

enrichment? The alternative could be that instead of denying liability in
these cases, claimants would be allowed to present their case by the
standards of proof of civil trial, and if they could not provide sufficient
evidence of the defendant’s gain from their service, they would lose their case.

The higher administrative costs in the case of services are no doubt part of
the problem, but there is more to this case than that. The difference between
unconsented services and cases of mistaken provision of money or a material
object is that in the latter type of case we can cancel the mistaken action,
whereas in the case of the typical mistaken service we cannot. If I mistakenly
get a physical object or a mistaken money payment and am then required to
give them up, I stand in exactly the same position as I would have if the
mistake had not occurred. If someone cuts my lawn without my request and
I decide that I do not want to pay the market price for it, the cut grass blades
cannot be reattached. Thus, the effect of the unrequested service is to force
upon me a new state of affairs with regard to my entitlements. Even supposing
the sum I would have been willing to pay for the service is known if I elected
to have it, forcing me to pay the sum would in effect force me into a contract.
Denying recovery for unconsented services deters people from trying to
circumvent the market by conferring a service on others and then
coming forward to collect the bill.
But why does the law try to prevent circumventing the market? Are there no
cases in which people would benefit from such services by getting a service they
would otherwise never get, or at least not as cheaply? No doubt such cases are
imaginable, and the further we are from conditions of perfect market competition
the more likely it is that we will encounter such cases. But in liberal societies
autonomy is valued to such a degree that the assumption is that intervention in
such cases is always problematic. To those who consider autonomy to be

intrinsically valuable, these cases are problematic for eliminating individual
choice. Those who believe that autonomy is valuable because individuals are
usually best positioned to promote their well-being are likely to be suspicious of
suggestions that the law should create such transactions against the better
judgment of the individual. (Indeed, many of the differences between the
political ideologies ranging from libertarianism to communism on
questions ranging from the optimal ‘size’ of government to the right approach
to interpreting contracts can be explained by the degree to which its proponents
trust people’s ability to know on their own what is likely to promote their wellbeing.)
The assumption underlying the rule, then, is that contracts are important for
individuals’ autonomy because they are a vehicle for individuals to determine
what shape their lives will take and perhaps also because they are a means for
getting objects and services that improve individuals’ well-being. And the
corresponding assumption is that forcing people to pay for services they did
not request will therefore negatively impact their autonomy.11 A related reason
has to do with the fact that conferring a service on another, unlike mistakenly
paying

them, almost inevitably involves violating their autonomy by

interfering with their body or their property in the first place. (This is why a
gift of a service is typically a gift of an option to get the service, not the service
itself.)This is not true in the case of mistaken payments (or self-interested
actions that have positive externalities).

The borderline case: free acceptance

Free acceptance is a term coined by Goff and Jones to describe the case of a
person who ‘ha[s] been benefited by the receipt of services . . . unless he has
accepted them . . . with an opportunity of rejection and with actual or presumed
knowledge that they were to be paid for’.12 An oft-discussed example of free
acceptance provided by Birks is of a ‘window-cleaner [who] begins[s] to clean the
windows of my house. I know that he will expect to be paid. So I hang back
unseen till he has finished the job; then I emerge and maintain that I will not pay
for work which I never ordered’.13
Should cases of free acceptance give rise to restitutionary liability? Birks
believed that they should.14 The crucial element in Birks’s view is the fact that the
recipient of the service knew that the claimant expected to be paid for the service
and yet chose not to reject it despite having an easy opportunity to do so. Other
scholars have argued that cases of free acceptance should not give rise to liability.
In effect they have argued that cases of free acceptance should be treated under
the general rule that denies liability for unconsented services.15 One central
reason for this conclusion, as Burrows put it, is that

there would be no injustice in my not paying a risk-taker. For even if I can be said
to have acted shabbily, this is matched by the fact that the claimant was a risk-taker
– without any inducement he gambled on my willingness to pay. Why should we
now want to protect him against the very risk that he undertook?16

At first, this seems exactly in line with the argument developed in the previous
section. Contract is the legal mechanism with which people can regulate their
future risks, and those who avoid it when they could have used it do not deserve
the law’s assistance. We can imagine a spectrum at one end of which there is no
contract. This case is analytically identical to a blank contract in which a provider
of a service or a good takes the risk as to the willingness of the recipient to pay
for service as well as the amount she will pay after the service is provided. (Of
course, contract law will not enforce this kind of ‘contract’, and it will not do so,
inter alia, for the reason Burrows mentions in the passage just quoted.) We can
then imagine a series of increasingly more complete contracts, that is, contracts
that take care of more aspects of the transaction: first basic aspects like price,
quantity, and quality; the contracts then begin to cover possible contingencies,
beginning with ones that are fairly likely (temporary shortage in the supply of a
certain raw material) and end at alien invasion. The more complete is the
contract, the more expensive it is (both because of increasing costs of drafting and
because of the greater likelihood that the parties will disagree on something and
thus fail to contract). In a sense, contracting involves investing present money for
future returns where parties are given a wide range of risk versus return options:
the less one invests ex ante in making the contract, the higher is the risk that some
contingency not covered in the contract will occur; but if ex post it turns out that
the contingency has not occurred, then the costs incurred in adding this
contingency to the contract have been a waste, and so reduced the

contracting parties’ returns on their investment.17 On the other hand, the
fewer the details found in the contract, the more likely it is that the parties will
disagree on their respective obligations and the more difficult will it be to make
factual determinations on the matter. For this reason beyond a certain point
the law will not be willing to offer its (highly subsidised) service of dispute
resolution to such transactions.
Against this theoretical background we can look at the question of free
acceptance from a slightly different angle than usual: the question is not whether
a risk-taker should be allowed to be protected by the law of restitution against the
very risk he took, but rather whether an unconsented service provider should be
considered a risk-taker at all. Put differently, the question that this example forces
upon us is where must one stand on the spectrum just mentioned to be able to
enjoy the state-provided insurance mechanism known as ‘contract law’.
Neither Birks nor those debating with him explicitly discussed the question of
free acceptance in terms of the limits of the law’s protection of voluntary
undertakings. But the point on the spectrum where one is entitled to enjoy the
benefits that come from making a contract is not a law of nature: in some legal
systems one can find oneself with a binding contract more easily than in others.18
The first step in my argument will therefore be to try to show that, though this is
not explicitly how the debate on free acceptance is usually framed, it is in fact
better understood as concerned with this question.
To begin with, the term ‘free acceptance’ includes the same word familiar from
contract law as the mechanism for perfecting contractual obligations. More than

verbal support is found in the rationales provided in the debates on free
acceptance: when Birks first defended imposing liability in free acceptance
cases he conceded that ‘[i]t would not have been possible to dispense with the
contractual explanation if there were not a sound basis for imposing the
restitutionary obligation’.19 This is quite revealing, because one would have
thought (especially in the case of Birks) that the analysis should go from rules to
legal conclusions and not the other way around. If there is no good contractual
explanation of such cases, the most natural conclusion should have been that
there is no basis for liability at all.20 But turning Birks’s point on its head it
might be asked, if a contractual explanation is possible for these situations,
why is restitutionary analysis necessary?
Leaving these somewhat technical points aside, let us look at the substance of
Birks’s argument. Initially, Birks formulated it thus: ‘The claimant has conferred
a benefit on the defendant expecting some return for himself and not intending to
confer a gift upon the defendant. . . . [W]hy should he not receive the value?’21 In
fact, when Birks specified the conditions for the imposition of liability in cases of
free acceptance one of them is that the defendant ‘must have known of that intent
[ie, a non-gratuitous intent] to confer a benefit’.22 Birks later refined and qualified
his earlier position and argued that the unjust factor in free acceptance is ‘the
unconscientious rejection of an opportunity to save the intervener from the risk
he was running’.23 This, however, seems a rather unusual position: the law does
not typically impose liability on people who have an opportunity to save people
from running risks. So by itself this cannot be an unjust factor. What makes this

situation (if it does) unjust is the existence of a special relationship between the
claimant and the defendant; and we are likely to conclude that such a relationship
existed exactly in those situations in which a contract or something like it
was governing their relationship so that we may conclude that each party has
undertaken, explicitly or implicitly, to reduce some of the risks the other was
running.
Another defender of free acceptance, Ewan McKendrick, also resorted to the
language familiar from contract to describe the basis of restitutionary liability. He
discussed a case in which one party delivered steel nodes to another while the
parties were negotiating the terms for a contract. The contract eventually failed
to materialise due to a certain disagreement between the parties and the
delivering party sued.24 McKendrick contends that the basis for liability is that
the recipients ‘requested steel nodes of a particular quality and in a particular
order’, which the claimant then delivered. Even if there is no formal contract
here, it is clear that the liability is grounded in consent. With regard to the
appropriate remedy in such a case McKendrick even said that ‘a court [could]
take account

of the expectation of the buyer and provide protection

accordingly’.25
It is not only the defenders of free acceptance who are better understood as
arguing for redrawing of the boundaries of contract; the same is true of
arguments made by the proposed doctrine’s critics. Some of them have asked why
we should impose an obligation on the defendant in such a case when the
service provider could have easily asked the defendant whether she wanted the

service (ie when what is normally considered the straightforward contractual
route was so evidently open).26 This claim could be restated as questioning the
desirability of expanding the law’s protection to those who have behaved in a
manner that imposes unnecessary costs on others and on the judicial
system. For similar reasons, critics of free acceptance have referred to the
limits on acceptance of contractual offers by silence, and criticised the fact
that Birks’s notion of free acceptance can bring in liability through a
restitutionary back door after contractual liability has been denied at the front.27
Though sceptical of the view that restitutionary liability should be imposed in
cases of free acceptance, critics of the idea make it clear that something not far
from it – even if not a fully-fledged contract – deserves legal protection. In
determining whether restitutionary liability should be imposed, Burrows, for
example, invokes what he calls the ‘bargained-for’ test, which he explicitly says is
supposed to cover cases of ‘void, unenforceable, incomplete, or anticipated
contracts’.28 And his examples of cases in which (restitutionary) liability should
be imposed when people try to subvert contractual mechanism all come
from contractual settings.
Also revealing is the remedy a service provider would receive if he succeeds in
a free acceptance claim.The standard remedy is quantum meruit as measured by the
market price, which, when lacking any information to the contrary, is typically
the price the parties would have agreed upon if they had made a contract.
Consequently, in these cases, even though formally the protected interest is
restitution, the reality in practice will coincide with the expectation interest.29

And to the extent that the recipient can challenge that price, it is by pointing to
what Birks called ‘subjective devaluation’, ie by showing that she would only have
agreed to contract for the service she received for less than the market price. Birks
never considered the possibility of an opposite suggestion of ‘subjective
overvaluation’, which suggests that he may have recognised that in a situation like
this, a claimant who has already been protected from the risk of not having her
claim legally recognised should bear the risk of proof of lower contractual price,
even if it is one that she would not have agreed to.30
We see then that once we ignore existing legal categories, most debate on free
acceptance is in fact concerned with the boundaries of consent-based liability.
There is, however, one type of free acceptance that cannot reasonably be
understood in contractual terms. In what Birks called ‘secret acceptance’ the
recipient secretly hides at home when someone else provides her with a
service.31 When the service is complete she comes out to inform the service
provider that she will not pay.This is an extremely unlikely hypothetical, and
even if we thought that such a case calls for the imposition of liability, its
practical relevance would be small. No-one found in a situation such this would
do the one thing that could lead to liability.
Despite its practical insignificance, this case is interesting because it is the one
case in which Birks believes liability should not be imposed. This is revealing,
because if Birks had really been committed to the notion of free acceptance and
not to that of consent-based obligation, should there have been a difference
between this case and other cases of free acceptance? Birks classifies free

acceptance under the heading of ‘defendant-sided restitution’,32 and he argues
that the reason why liability should be imposed in free acceptance cases is that
‘shabbiness’ of the recipient’s behaviour. But if we focus on the recipient there
hardly seems to be any difference between the cases of the secret recipient
and that of the known recipient, as both have a similar opportunity to
reject the service. If anything, the behaviour of the person who remains in
hiding until the provider completes her work and then comes out to tease her,
looks shabbier.
Compared with the artificiality and complexity that the free acceptance
analysis requires from us, consent-based analysis makes the distinction between
the cases of secret and known acceptance straightforward. Whether or not we
ultimately decide to impose liability in cases of known acceptance the answer
depends on whether we believe that there are good reasons for setting the
boundary of consent-based liability before the point of a fully articulated
agreement. Free and secret acceptance are very different in this regard, and while
under certain conditions ‘normal’ free acceptance might be thought
sufficient for entering the domain of consent-based liability, secret acceptance
does not come even close.
If what I claim here is correct, it immediately raises the question of why the
debate has not been conducted more explicitly in terms of the limits of consentbased liability or the boundary of voluntary obligations. Why, that is, has the
debate not been about whether the requirements for entry into contract should
be changed? The normative arguments and legal conclusions might have been

roughly the same, but their ‘location’ would have been on the edges of contract
law, rather than at the heart of restitution law. Arguably, this is the place where
anyone concerned with the clarity of the law would have preferred this debate
to have taken place.
There are several possible answers. First, the debate has mostly been conducted
by restitution scholars eager to show that restitution law is a significant body of
law. This is in line with their reinterpretation of various other areas of law that
have been traditionally handled under other headings (eg, the outcomes of
rescinded contracts) that restitution lawyers claim ‘really’ belong within the law of
unjust enrichment or restitution. Restitution being close to these scholars’ hearts,
they may have been inclined to look at the issue through the restitutionary lens
and not the contractual one. Second, for those who might find churlish the
suggestion that restitution scholars simply want a larger chunk of the law for
themselves, there may be a deeper reason for this tendency of enlarging
restitution at the expense of contract. At least in English law, the
fundamentals of contractual doctrine familiar to us today crystallised in the
course of the nineteenth century and they have remained relatively stable for
a long time.33 (By contrast, rules regarding the content of contracts once a
contract is formed proved more flexible.) Perhaps by now these rules are
perceived as so deeply entrenched and therefore no longer open to significant
change. In contrast, restitution – still considered a relatively fertile ground whose
boundaries are in flux – provides an easier location for adjusting the law.34
Finally, it might be said in response that it is a mistake to treat the rigid rules

of entry to contract as a mere historical accident; rather, they reflect a
substantive view about the sort of situations that should be covered by contract
law.This, however, is simply to beg the question as to what the boundaries of
contractual liability should be. There may be good reasons for maintaining
fairly rigid limits to consent-based liability, but these should be stated
clearly.The claim that there should not be liability in cases of free acceptance
reflects this position, but it is obscured from view when restitutionary concepts
are introduced into the discussion. For those who believe that there should be
liability in some cases of free acceptance matters are even worse, for they have
to explain how they can support rigid rules of entry to contract and at the same
time support a doctrine that undermines these rules. It matters little that this
doctrine does not formally affect contractual rules because it is treated as part of a
different area of law, if its practical effect, as can be seen from the argument
invoked in support of the doctrine, is to expand the scope of consent-based
liability.
Incidentally, I think the explanation offered in the last paragraph goes some
way to explaining why restitution law has flourished in English law, whereas in
other countries – notably the United States – lawyers, and even more so academic
lawyers, seem to be getting by without much need for it.35 In the US, courts and
commentators are much more willing to question or change established doctrine
on the basis of a more open discussion of the normative considerations
underlying the doctrine,36 and perhaps as a result the rules regarding entry into
contract have been eroded more than in English law.37 As a result there was

simply much less of a need to develop alternative non-contractual doctrines,
where revised contract rules sufficed.38

THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACT

So far I have sought to show that a significant chunk of what is now classified
under restitution is normatively closer to the question of the boundaries of
consent-based liability. It might be claimed, however, that this is not an argument
in favour of a new kind of ‘quasi-contractual’ liability, but only a reason for
discussing more openly, and perhaps relaxing, the appropriate requirements for
entry to contract. Is this therefore merely an argument over words? To some
extent this may be true: so long as we reach the ‘right’ decisions, that is, the
optimal ones by whichever normative non-legal standards we adhere to, then
labels may not matter much. To take an example from a different domain, some
events can be treated both as breaches of contract and as torts of negligent
misrepresentation; and even though the typical contract remedy is expectation
damages and the typical tort remedy is reliance damages, their measure in such
instances can be quite similar if we take lost opportunities into account.
Comparative legal history likewise shows that often different legal frameworks
overlapped on outcomes even when they differed in the way to get there. This is
not hard to explain: legal classifications hardly ever operate in isolation from our
sense of the correct disposition of the case.
Nonetheless the earlier discussion is important for it purported to rattle

existing categories and to show how such categorisations can obscure discussion
of the real issues at hand, as much as they sometimes help us by getting us quickly
to a particular outcome. Labels send us down certain normative routes and can
thus affect our judgments, especially in borderline cases when different
classifications yield different outcomes. Once this is recognised, it is easier to
accept the argument developed in this section, which poses an even more
fundamental challenge to the boundaries of contract. It is here that the idea of
quasi-contract can be particularly illuminating. Unlike the cases of free acceptance
that are better explained as dealing with the limits of contract, cases of
emergency service, the subject of this section, show how quasi-contractual
liability is valuable exactly because they fall outside the boundaries of contract
but are best explained by the relation they take to proper contractual relations.

The limits of restitutionary analysis

In a typical emergency case a person provides a service when the latter is
unconscious and in mortal danger and cannot consent to the service. The
question that interests us is not whether one may be liable to pay compensation
if he fails to do so. On this matter, as is well known, the traditional common law
answer is negative. Rather the question we are concerned with is whether one is
entitled to remuneration for his services if he chooses to provide the service. Such
claims have often proved successful in common law jurisdictions, and many times
even when the treatment failed.39 It is worth examining first how such cases are

analysed in restitutionary terms.
Burrows offers such an account using the analysis familiar to English lawyers
of locating a benefit, examining whether it was unjust and whether the
enrichment is at the claimant’s expense. (I disregard the question of defences.)
Examining the first two elements of restitutionary liability reveals the artificiality
of the unjust enrichment route. According to Burrows, the unjust factor in this
case is ‘the policy-motivated desire of the law to encourage people to
intervene to preserve the health and property of others’.40 The first odd
thing about this suggestion is the attempt to force it into the restitutionary
category. We do not need to rely on restitutionary analysis to impose liability:
at least within the Birksian framework (that Burrows accepts) such liability
could be placed within the miscellaneous category. Placing it within the
category of restitutionary is justified, then, only if doing so helps
understanding both of why liability is imposed and the scope of liability. In
fact, it does neither.
It is hard to see how such a policy consideration could be an ‘unjust factor’ unless
the term ‘unjust factor’ is stripped of all meaning. After all, any goal we wish to
promote can be dubbed a ‘policy’ we wish to promote, and thus become an unjust
factor: the performance of contracts and the prevention of accidents are also
policies society may wish to promote. Recognising policy motivated unjust factors
leads to the very conclusion restitutionary lawyers fought so hard against, namely
that restitution is the name we give to all liability that does not fall under contract
or tort. In other words, the attempt to cover rescue cases comes at the expense of

completely emptying restitution law of normative coherence and undermining
the main reason that has restitution scholars identify it as a distinct legal category.41
In saying this I do not wish to deny that there are policy considerations underlying
the decision to impose liability in these cases. One would think (or at least hope)
that there is some good policy behind all laws.All I wish to say is that the idea of
such cases as explained by the ‘policy-motivated’, unjust factor does little to
advance our understanding of the outcome of these cases.
A more significant problem exists with a different element of the traditional
restitutionary analysis, that of enrichment (thus posing a problem also to
alternative restitutionary analyses like the one used in Canada, which does not
require the showing of an ‘unjust factor’).The facts of a famous American case,
Cotnam v Wisdom42 (Cotnam), provide a useful point of departure. In this
case the claimants, two surgeons, sued the estate of one Harrison they had
operated on in an attempt to save his life after a car accident. Because the
deceased was unconscious the medical services were provided without
Harrison’s consent.The court ruled in the claimants’ favour despite the fact that
the operation failed and the patient died.
If we want to fit such a case within a restitutionary analysis we need to find
the benefit that the recipient got from the service. What could that benefit be?
Burrows suggests that the ‘the very necessity . . . suggests that the intervention
was an incontrovertible negative benefit’.43 Negative benefit is Burrows’s term
for having an expense one was required to pay saved because it was paid by
someone else. But the question in cases of emergency is exactly what the expense

that the unconsented service provided is.There are two possibilities here: one is
that the ‘negative benefit’ is the cost of the emergency service; the other is that
the ‘negative benefit’ is having the losses associated with the emergency
prevented.According to the first interpretation, the claimant is entitled to benefit
for the service she provided only if it was successful. In that case, however,
her entitlement is measured by the ‘negative benefit’ she saved the defendant and
she is entitled to a significant portion of this benefit.This is the ex post
analysis.The ex ante analysis is one that does not measure whether the claimant
succeeded, but whether she tried with the requisite diligence; if she did, she is
entitled to the ex ante cost of that service whether or not the service turned out
successful.
Usually restitution scholars analyse such questions from the perspective of the
benefit the recipient of the service actually made, that is, ex post. But Cotnam is a
good example of the other option: in Cotnam the claimants succeeded in their
claim despite failing. In fact, cases like Cotnam show why the ex post analysis is
problematic whether or not the service is successful. If the treatment fails, then
the ex post benefit of the recipient is zero, and so the claim should fail. If on the
other hand the operation is a complete success and the recipient returns to
normal life, then the ex post benefit to the recipient is much higher than quantum
meruit, what restitution scholars believe is the correct remedy,44 which is typically
the market price for the service provided. 45 In fact, the law provides us with an
example of such an ex post rule: maritime law entitles a rescuing ship to up to 50
per cent of the value of what is rescued from a sinking ship, but this entitlement

depends on success; failed rescuers receive no remuneration at all.46
If such cases cannot be adequately analysed in restitutionary terms, how should
they be considered? In his latest writings Birks turned back on his earlier view
and suggested such cases are best filed under a miscellaneous category, which
includes a hodgepodge of all claims that have in common only the fact that they
are not based in contract, tort, or restitution. Though the change in view is a
characteristic example of Birks’s intellectual honesty, it is in some sense an
admission of failure, because this category includes such different cases that we
have absolutely no guidance as to how these cases should be treated.47
Let us now see whether the notion of quasi-contract can help us understand
what is at stake. Cases of emergency take us beyond what has already been
discussed, because here we need to ask whether to impose liability in certain
circumstances in which no contract has been made between the parties but when
we have good reason to believe that such a contract would have been made if the parties had
had the opportunity to do so.This analysis is more fitting for these cases because by
trying to find what the parties would have contracted for, it adopts an ex ante
perspective. Interestingly, once again we see that commentators who reject the
quasi-contractual analysis end up explaining the situation by invoking contractual
concepts. For example, in explaining why liability should be imposed only on
successful attempts, Burrows writes:‘A reasonable man [sic] would surely pay for
someone to try to rescue his drowning daughter or to try to save his burning
house’.48 Burrows comes close to stating the quasi-contractual rationale for
imposing liability: the reason why liability should be imposed in such cases is

because people would have been willing to pay for the service (even without the
guarantee of success), if they had had the opportunity to do so.
Within a quasi-contractual analysis it is not difficult to explain why liability
need not be limited to successful attempts. In many contracts for service, the
service provider does not promise a certain result, only a certain degree of effort.
If the promisor fulfils her contractual liability by performing to that level, she does
not breach her contractual obligation even if the service she provides does not
match a certain desired outcome. By contrast, in principle, if the promisor fails to
perform to the same degree required by the contract, she breaches the contract
even if the non-contracted yet desired outcome is achieved.49

The conditions for imposing quasi-contractual liability for emergencies

The previous section has shown that attempts to explain emergency rescue fail
both in terms of fitting restitution to the doctrine and also in forcing upon the
subject a loosening of its categories that leaves it almost devoid of normative
content. In this section I aim to show that a quasi-contractual analysis can do
better. A true emergency situation that should give rise to quasi-contractual
liability exists in the following situation: an uncontracted-for service is provided
when (a) transaction costs for the contract are prohibitively high; (b) had the
service not been provided, the recipient of the service would have suffered a
considerable real loss; (c) the recipient has not provided evidence to suggest that
she would have declined the service if she had had the opportunity to do so; and

(d) the service provided was of adequate quality. If these conditions obtain and
someone provides an unconsented service to another, the provider of the service
is entitled to recover from the person she assisted, whether or not her service was
successful. (This suggests that if the service is of poor quality but nonetheless
succeeds, the service provider is not entitled to remedy. But the likelihood of
dispute in such cases is low.)
The four conditions highlight the quasi-contractual aspect of this sort of
liability, both by limiting liability to those situations in which contracts were not
made only because of high transaction costs, and by their focus on the ex ante
perspective. As with all cases of comparing reality to a hypothetical case, this
approach raises a question as to which hypothetical situation we envisage and
how different we make it from what actually took place: do we imagine the
recipient in perfect health making a contract with the person who provided him
with the service, or do we change the facts as little as possible from how things
actually were and imagine the recipient consenting to a contract with the service
provider in the last moments before losing consciousness? The latter situation
may seem the better one because it is ‘closer’ to how things were. However, this
case is problematic from a contractual perspective: it is hard to know what a
market price for such a case would be, partly because there are not enough such
cases to establish a market price. Further, in such cases it would be rational for the
recipient to agree to pay anything for a treatment, down to the level of
subsistence below which he would rather not stay alive, and because at this
moment the particular service provider is a monopolist, it is possible that she will

demand such a price.This implies that in such cases the recipient’s willingness to
pay would be strongly affected by his ability to pay, which differs considerably
among people. More broadly, the latter scenario is one in which one’s
autonomy is compromised.As quasi-contract liability is supposed to be grounded
in the same notions of autonomy that ground contractual liability, which
were discussed in the beginning of this essay, clearly the first hypothetical is
the one that fits it better. It is also the hypothetical that matches the liability rule
proposed.
Another aspect of the proposal worth highlighting is that it does not try to
identify emergency cases directly. Rather, it assumes that emergency cases are
cases of ‘considerable loss’ (and not merely cases of foregone opportunity to make
a profit) and limits recovery to them.The basis for this definition is psychological:
even though from an economic perspective a lost profit is (more or less) similar
to an actual loss of similar size, people tend to react very differently to actual losses
and foregone benefits.50 The second and third conditions provide additional
indirect guarantee that only true cases of emergency are captured in the
definition.The claimant in such a case would have to show that transaction costs
were high, or else her quasi-contractual claim would fail for not taking the
contractual route when it was readily available.The third condition not only
provides an easy way for the service recipient to avoid liability, but also helps
identify rescue cases on the assumption that in other cases the recipient
would have rejected the service.51
Another advantage of the suggested solution over that of free acceptance is

that in cases that do not fall under it, the recipient will not have to reject the
service because the provider will not be able to establish the first condition.
Birks’s solution requires the recipient of the service to actively reject the service
or otherwise risk having to pay for it. Because the proposed alternative is more
finely tailored to identify those instances in which liability should be imposed, in
all non-emergency situations the recipient of a service will not have to do
anything to avoid liability for unconsented services.

FAIRNESS, QUASI-CONTRACT, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

The discussion so far has sought to establish that many debates thought to belong
to restitution are in fact more easily understood as debates about the boundaries
of consent-based liability, and that even the most ardent defenders of restitution,
under the veneer of the jargon of restitution or unjust enrichment, engage in the
debate on those terms.The surprising finding there was that if we are interested
in clear and open discussion, it is the language of restitution that is obfuscating
and the language of quasi-contract that better highlights the relevant normative
and doctrinal questions at hand. Those who care for the law speaking clearly
would do well to return to speaking of quasi-contract. We have also seen that
quasi-contractual analysis provides us with guidance when dealing with these
cases, guidance that the vague and highly malleable language preferred by
restitution lawyers does not. In particular we have seen that quasi-contractual
analysis helps us understand why the typical remedy in rescue cases is

quantum meruit. This remedy is unproblematic if we adopt the ex ante
perspective suggested by quasi-contract, but it is odd if understood as
part of a remedy for ex post gain-based restitution: potentially too low if the
service proved successful, clearly too high if the service failed.
It would be a mistake, however, to think of the suggested quasi-contractual
analysis as a panacea. No-one should expect a verbal formula or a ‘test’ to solve
a normative problem. And no doubt the analysis proposed here raises difficulties
that other analyses may avoid. We have already seen that the need to resort to
counterfactuals about what the parties would have done always involves making
some factual and normative assumptions.This, however, is inevitable: law is in the
business of telling people what to do, so there is no avoiding engagement in
normative inquiry.Two approaches, not always easily distinguishable, have tried to
show why this last point is wrong. One approach sought to find the answer in the
cases.This approach is appealing to its proponents, for it seemed to organise and
harness what beforehand looked an unruly and disparate body of case-law into
a neat and highly structured framework; at the same time it enabled its
proponents to think that in engaging in this kind of inquiry they were doing ‘pure’
legal analysis, unadulterated by alien ideas coming from moral philosophy,
economics or other disciplines.
The leading proponent of this approach was Peter Birks who defended it
against ‘realism’,52 and who once wrote that in trying to explain restitution one
should favour an approach that is ‘downward-looking to the cases’.53 There is a
growing sense that this approach has failed, and in retrospect it is not difficult to

see why. Cases do not organise themselves into categories, and the categories
themselves do not descend from heaven. They are based on certain normative
assumptions that are there even if they are not explicitly mentioned. Very few
now accept the view that there is a single principle of unjust enrichment that can
explain all cases classified as restitutionary, and Birks’s constantly changing views
on questions of taxonomy may be the best evidence of the limitations of this
approach. Arguably, many of those problems would have been avoided if he and
others following him had been willing to lift their gaze up from the cases.
The alternative approach sought guidance in a normative principle, but one
that was supposedly found in the cases.That principle, corrective justice, owes its
appeal to the same attitude that motivated Birks’s purely legal scholarship. It
seemed thin, pale and simple compared to the more normatively ambitious
attempts to explain private law as part of a distributive justice scheme, and it
seemed to match the cases better than the often counterintuitive arguments
offered by legal economists. It was hailed by its champions as a principle that is
‘immanent’ in the law, which in turn explains why there has been so much
affinity between this view and doctrinal scholarship: if all the answers to what the
law should be are already in the law, doctrinal scholars can go on doing what they
have always been doing, helping the common law work itself pure without
worrying much about the ‘high theory’ of the philosophers and the economists.
Unfortunately, this closeness to the cases is exactly why corrective justice
provides so little help in justifying the law. If understood as a conceptual claim
about what unjust enrichment was about, it cannot explain what content this

area of law should have, or for that matter why it should exist at all. If
considered alternatively as a normative principle, it is open to the challenge that
it conflicts with (and otherwise affects) other desired goals. Once this point
is acknowledged, those who adopt the corrective justice view have to
explain why a priori those other normative goals should be ignored in the
context of private law litigation.54 What often happened was that in order to
answer this question, proponents of the corrective justice view appealed to
considerations such as separation of powers or the institutional capacity of
courts. Whatever merit such arguments may have, they clearly are not internal
to private law or corrective justice.
As I see it, a normative theory of a particular area of law must be made to fit
two different questions. At the first level it must be explained within a broader
account of the legitimate power of the state. In this respect ‘private’ law is no less
in need of justification than criminal law or tax law.At the second level, however,
every area of law raises unique normative questions that relate to the issues it
governs.When discussing the foundations of liability in various areas of law there
is a tendency to focus only on the second question and to assume that the answer
to the question of legitimacy at the first level leaves the second level largely
unaffected. Though this is a popular approach among private law theorists, it
seems to me to be mistaken, or at least in need of justification, because it seems
to load the dice in favour of certain normative views about private law. If I am
right about this, it implies, for example, that what might be the best account of
the conditions under which we are morally obliged to compensate people for

harm we caused them may not be a good normative account of the area of law
that governs these sorts of situations. It is, put simply, not obviously true that
within the domain of private relations between individuals it is the job of the state
to enforce only obligations that exist between individuals in the state of nature
(whatever those obligations might be).
Plainly, this is not the place for addressing the question in what sort of ways
questions on the first normative level may affect questions on the second. But
when trying to address this question it will be useful to understand the sort of
normative considerations that seem to be at play at the second level. In this sort
of inquiry getting a firmer grasp on the pre-theoretical, moral intuitions at play
is likely to prove useful, and since these matters have been subject to important
empirical work in recent years it would be helpful to consider them here.55 Work
in this area has identified what are believed to be the five basic components of
interpersonal morality: harm, fairness, in-group loyalty, hierarchy, and purity.56
The most relevant in the present context are norms of fairness. In the course of
a discussion that has little to do with unjust enrichment Daniel Kahneman and
his colleagues suggested that ‘[t]he cardinal rule of fair behavior is surely that
one person should not achieve gain by simply imposing an equivalent loss on
another’.57 Though this description seems to capture the ‘core case’ of mistaken
payment,58 it also captures (at least in general outline) other areas of the law that
are not traditionally considered part of unjust enrichment (like the tort of
conversion) and property (claims of vindication) as well as at least some aspects
of breach of contract. As such, it does not help us identify unjust enrichment as

a distinct area of law.
However, the psychological literature on fairness is useful in going beyond
such fact situations to cases deemed unfair when one person takes advantage of
circumstances in ways that do not impose real loss on another. Experimental
studies on the ultimatum game are the classic example: in these experiments one
of two players is given a sum of money (known to both).The first player is then
requested to offer as much as she wishes from that sum to the other player.The
second player, in turn, can either accept the offer, in which case she takes what
she was offered and the first takes the remainder, or reject the offer, in which case
both players get nothing. Experimental studies found that considerations of
fairness often constrain both the initial offer and the decision whether to accept
or reject it. Offers were typically equal or close to equal, and in cases where they
were not, the recipient many times elected to reject the offer and thus forego a
benefit (an ‘incontrovertible benefit’ in the language of restitution lawyers) in
order to ‘punish’ behaviour deemed unfair.59
I believe it is these sentiments, and not a theory of corrective justice, that lie
behind many of the doctrines nowadays usually classified as part of the law of
restitution. To put it differently (and reinforce a point made above), whatever
appeal the principle of corrective justice may have, it is one that derives from the
fact that it seems to restore fairness in some cases of (perceived) unfairness.To give
just one example, cases such as Pettkus v Becker,60 which involve the sharing of
property between unmarried domestic partners upon the dissolution of their
partnership, need not be explained on the basis of a broad-ranging concern to

fight the unequal treatment of women in society. A narrower basis for such a
decision (one that would be equally at play in the context of business partners)
is the unfairness in any situation in which two people invest a comparable
amount of work in an enterprise but only one of them gets the benefits. (In
saying this I do not deny the significance of the legal recognition of the fact that
domestic partnership is a domain to which norms of fairness apply and that
certain social norms, perhaps norms relating to hierarchy, contributed to the
unfair treatment of women.)
Fairness is, however, unpopular in some circles, so much so that many wish to
eliminate it altogether from legal and political discourse.61 It is blamed for being
both vague and undesirable for leading to unwanted outcomes. Our first task,
therefore, is to provide a definition of fairness that is sufficiently precise and
relevant to the current discussion. I propose the following definition, limited as it
is to the context under consideration: a fair award for a good or service is one that
corresponds, in the sense that it is neither considerably higher nor considerably
lower, to other awards for similar goods or services.
There are various ambiguities (eg, is a snow shovel in the middle of the
summer similar to a snow shovel a day after a snow storm?) and limitations to this
definition (are fairness norms inapplicable when there is no basis for
comparison?). At the level of moral intuition, which is my focus here, I doubt
there is much I can say about them. What interests me is to show why liability
is more likely to be imposed in the cases I classified as quasi-contract than in
some other cases that may also involve questions of fairness.What makes quasi-

contract cases unique is that typically they call for the imposition of liability in
situations that imitate efficient transactions, and as such they will be easier
cases to accept even for those who are not friends of fairness in general.
This point requires a bit more elaboration: typical contracts are both efficient
and fair. They are efficient because normally (ie, barring negative externalities
and assuming moderate rationality and knowledge of the contracting parties)
they will be entered where both parties stand to benefit from them. They are also
fair because they are typically entered into in a market setting that (once again
assuming moderate rationality of the contracting parties) will guarantee the
fairness of the transaction. The emergency cases I propose to analyse as instances
of liability for quasi-contract are those which are close enough to contractual
cases so that we have sufficient reason to think that the imposition of liability in
these cases will conform to both norms of fairness and the goal of efficiency.
This point helps us see the motivation behind many of the cases at the margin
of contract that were discussed in the first section, and why liability is more likely
to be imposed in the emergency cases discussed above than in some other cases
that look superficially quite similar to them. Take, for example, cases of mistaken
services and mistaken improvements. These typically take one of two forms: (a) A
contracts with B to provide her with a service; B mistakenly provides the service
to C; (b) D improves what she mistakenly thinks is her property but which in fact
belongs to E.These cases are similar to unconsented services cases, but are more
complicated than them in that in neither of these imaginary scenarios has there
been an attempt to circumvent the market. In addition, these cases are similar to

cases of mistaken payment in that they (may) involve two innocent parties; they
are, however, more complicated than mistaken payment cases, because in such
scenarios typically the service provided cannot be undone.
Clearly the quasi-contractual analysis proposed above cannot be the basis for
imposing liability in such cases. Can there be a different basis for the imposition
of liability in these cases? This, if you want, is where we could define the domain
of unjust enrichment beyond that of quasi-contract (rather than quasi-contract
being part of unjust enrichment).Any defender of the idea of unjust enrichment
as a separate basis for liability must answer this question affirmatively, for it is cases
such as this in which fairness is exclusive justification for the imposition of legal
liability. There are legal decisions imposing liability in such situations,62 they are
more controversial than cases of emergency. My suspicion is that, just as in
the case of quasi-contract, successful claims will usually involve more than just
fairness. Examples of that extra ingredient could be positive evidence of lack of
negligence on part of the claimant and evidence that her actions in no way are
an attempt to circumvent the market; some sort of fault on the part of the
defendant (eg, in marking the boundaries of her property); the existence of some
kind of proprietary interest and so on. If that is the case, that would suggest,
consistent with the views of some unjust enrichment sceptics, that rather than an
independent area of law explained by a unifying principle of unjust enrichment,
the cases treated as belonging to the area of unjust enrichment are better
understood as demonstrating the role of fairness as an auxiliary consideration that
influences doctrines in tort, contract, and property law, rather than providing an

independent basis for legal liability.
These are obviously tentative remarks on a broad topic. All they are meant to
show is how the notion of quasi-contract helps us not only understand what falls
underneath it, but also what falls outside of it, and how might such cases be
treated.

CONCLUSION

Let me summarise what thinking about the margins of consent-based liability has
taught us about certain cases usually treated as examples of liability for unjust
enrichment. First, we have seen why the general rule was that there was no
liability for unconsented services. We have seen that while in the case of mistaken
payments or the mistaken provision of material objects in kind there is no danger
that requiring the recipient to give up her benefit will somehow undermine the
contractual foundations of the market system. I have then argued that what is at
stake in the debate on free acceptance is the scope of consent-based liability,
which, of course, is also the foundation of contractual liability. Based on these
considerations I have argued that if we elect to impose liability in such
circumstances there are good reasons for calling it quasi-contractual. This is not
merely a helpful reminder to the general normative area in which this kind of
liability belongs, but also a source of inspiration and borrowing: contract
doctrine and contract theory are more elaborately developed and detailed than
restitutionary

doctrine and theory, and there are good reasons for

examining them when considering the related area of free acceptance. Then, I
have sought to explain how quasi-contractual liability helps us understand
why in cases of emergency the law departs from its general policy of denial of
liability for unconsented services, because, as in the case of mistaken payments,
such cases do not typically increase the likelihood that people will abandon
contracting as the usual method for acquiring goods and services. More
importantly, I have argued that quasicontractual liability helps us understand
two otherwise puzzling aspects of the law: first, why certain emergency cases did
not limit liability to successful services; and second, why the level of compensation
is measured at the market value of the service provided and not related to the
value of the benefit gained by the service. In all this, the term ‘quasi-contract’,
despite its quaint sound, is helpful in conveying something that the new
terminology of restitution and unjust enrichment does not.
In the end I also suggested more tentatively that this discussion may be helpful
for another question, namely the identification of the space that liability for
unjust enrichment could occupy. Unjust enrichment is unique among other areas
of private law in that both scholars and courts have expressed doubts about
whether it ‘exists’ or whether all the doctrines classified under it are better
understood as belonging to other areas of law. Debates over legal taxonomy are
often pointless, especially when the categorisation is attempted on the basis of
internal legal analysis. The analysis offered here, however, can be useful exactly
because it does not attempt to identify ‘correct’ legal categories by examining
legal materials. Looking beyond the law reveals in what sense such cases are

different from normal contractual cases and in what sense there might be room
for a distinct legal category of unjust enrichment. That discussion also made it
clear in what sense such a liability would go beyond – and therefore would be
more difficult to justify than – quasi-contractual liability. Whether this liability
could ever be justified is a matter for another occasion.
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